How many parliametary groups Iran's 9th Majlis would have?

 

What the term parliamentary groups signify is parliamentary political groups since fractions pertaining to a guild or objective for example parliamentary groups of Shaahed (pertaining to the children of martyrs), Isargaran (devotees of the Islamic Revolution and veterans of war), Women, the Environment and so on are almost pursuing non-political goals, and stand aside of our discussion. However, although a parliamentary group, Clerics is regarded as pertaining to a guild, it is also functioning as a political group.

 

Until now, various rounds of Iranian Majlis have included two parliamentary political groups: minority and majority, whose labels have changed several times. At times, the reformists comprised the majority of lawmakers, and at other times the Principlists stood under the sign of "the majority". Since political triumphs are gained factionally, which include open or covert coalitions, after a time the dominant faction undergoes a sort of convergence.

 

We are still remember that from the middle of the eight years term of reformist government and parliament, the distinction between individuals and groups attributed to the reformists front gradually became more transparent. The group of radical reformists was seeking a structural development, while the other group was not interested to this approach and believed interaction with the other sectors of the Islamic Republic system as a necessary measure. Even in their internal relations, each of these two groups were seeking a bigger share, which culminated in the election of second round of City Councils, the Seventh Majlis and the 8th presidential election, when they ran by introducing separate lists and candidates.

 

In the same manner, from the middle of the eighth government term in 2007 the Principlist front experienced such phenomenon, when we witnessed two different line ups: the Principalists who were critical of the actions taken by the government of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the Principalists who backed his policies and actions.

 

In the same manner, from the middle of the eighth government term in 2007, the Principlist front experienced such phenomenon, when we witnessed two different line ups: the Principalists who were critical of the actions taken by the government of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the Principalists who backed his policies and actions.

 

Although during the terms of the 6th-8th Majlis, the actions of the majority reformist parliamentary group were taken within the same framework, it does not mean that that the undercurrents were not involved. As a matter of fact, in the 6th Majlis, political parties like Mardomsalari (Democracy), Hambastegi (Solidarity) and Rohaniyoun-e Mobarez (The Association of Combatant Clerics) did not break their alignment with Mosharekat and Mojahedin-e Enqelab (Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution Organization). But from the middle of the eighth Majlis, the process of division kicked off and the parliamentary group, The Islamic Revolution came to being. This parliamentary group was backing the , and its members were not displeased to be called the “government proxy” and even were honored to be called so. Although the parliamentary group still regarded itself a subset of the majority Principalist party, it lacked the typical discipline involved in fractional activities. Thus it took an independent stance.

 

Therefore, regardless of the number of parliamentarians and their weight, the 8^th Majlis in reality had three active parliamentary parties: Principalists, the Islamic Revolution and Reformists.

 

When Ahmadinejad detached himself from the main Principalist camp, the group of government backers was also divided in two branches: those who were still supporting him and those who were formerly among his supporters!

 

The morphology of elected parliament candidates reveals that the forthcoming Majlis would have six parliamentary groups (or semi- parliamentary groups) which despite their weight would be as follows:

 

1. The parliamentary group of original Principalists;

 

2. The parliamentary group of government (affiliates or associates of Messrs Ahmadinejad, Mashaei, Rahimi);

 

3. The Resistance Front of the Islamic Revolution parliamentary group (the supporters of Mr. Ahmadinejad, but not his controversial chief of staff, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei as well as the first Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi);

 

4. The fraction of former Ahmadinejad's backers who have turned to his critics in the course of time;

 

5. Reformists parliamentary group;

 

6. Independents parliamentary group

 

Regarding the above divisions, some points could be taken into consideration:

It's not a big issue what name any parliamentary group would choose, since realities are not pledged on words. Obviously, each of these aforementioned parliamentary groups would pick an attractive title, but the real division will be manifested by the ideas and measures adopted by each group. However one cannot claim that the 9th Majlis will work with these parliamentary parties because by a little tolerance, the semi-parliamentary parties would be able to merge, for instance parliamentary groups 2 and 3 which tend to government, or absorption of Independent parliamentary group into the others, or gradual inactivity of Reformists parliamentary group.

 

The number of reformists in the 9th Majlis is not considerable as one may claim that they would not play a key role in the events of the Majlis. For this reason, the usual two parties division, Principalist and reformists would not be at stake in describing the political line-ups of the Parliament.

 

Moreover, probably the continuation of divergence process within the Principalist camp will be unavoidable. The parliamentary parties 2 to 4 all call themselves Principalist. Even some of them regard themselves as embodiment of Principalism and view the others outside the framework of Principalism. As a result, this term has lost both its effectiveness and comprehensiveness. Therefore, it's not unacceptable to say that for the sake of the term , all subsets through an implicit agreement or even unconsciously set aside the term Principalism and stress on their distinctions.

 

At the same time, it is predicted that a group would try to attach itself with the term, and regard that as its own property to take a double advantage: when some justly or unjustly embark on a divergence, the aforementioned group which carries the title of Principalism will have a recourse to emotional phrases like "the necessity for the unity of Principalists" to show them as problematic members of the social framework of Principalists.

 

In the same manner, when a number of original Principalist (even the founders, long standing members and those who represent original Principalism) introduce a new discourse which is different from the ideas of the above mentioned monopolist group, the latter will attempt to force them out of the framework and like several historical instances will label them as infidels and will effort to sweep them from the forefront only for replacing them.

 

It is the same group which during the run-up for the latest parliamentary election in Iran first had recourse to Jame'atein (Combatant Clergy Association and the Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom) to prevent various Principalists factions from parallel run-ups. The plot was executed by aggrandizing the threat of reformists. The monopolist group has nothing to give as a response to those Principalists who were saying: "Now, as we have no major rival, it's better to go on a rivalry among ourselves." It also ignored the lack of organizational discipline within some Principalist factions and refuse to exclude them from the main list of candidates. The monopolist group played its trump card in the last night to the Majlis election, took advantage ofall Principalist factions and made the traditional Principalists who had entrusted it to understand that to what extent one can abuse the terms honesty and morality in a game of politics.

 

The monopolist group proved that even does not believe in Mo'talefeh (the Islamic Coalition Party, a key Principalist faction) and misused the credence of Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani, the chairman of Iran's Assembly of Experts since it has already engineered the parliamentary election to take seats for its favored candidates.

 

If the Principalist camp of the Majlis undergoes a divergence, no parliamentary group will solely have a majority. This would lead to a more engaging play as we have seen in the parliaments of other countries. For instance, when The "Gaullists"[i] or The Union for the Defense of the Republic, and Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste) who have challenged each other from a long time ago form a coalition due to the threat of the radical right-wing faction’s empowerment.  

 

As the members of Conservative and Unionist Party find out that they are not able to overcome Labour Party Single-handedly on the political scene of the UK, they warmly shake the extended hand of Liberal Democrats.

When Social Democratic Party of Germany forms a coalition with the Ecological Democratic Party[ii] which just has limited seats in the parliament to inflict a political defeat on Christian Democratic Union of Germany, and at the other time, Christian Democratic Union takes the same advantage of the Ecological Democratic Party against Social Democratic Party.

 

We will witness the same coalitions in the 9th Majlis. For example, when a minister who is totally subordinate to Mr. Ahmadinejad is to be impeached, parliamentary groups 1, 4 and 5 will join each other to implement the plan, but in passing a plan for breaking ties with Europe Parliamentary groups 3 and 4 begin a tug of war against parliamentary groups 2 and 5. On the other hand, at an internal election for appointing the presiding board of the Majlis, parliamentary groups 2, 3 and 4 would face a showdown with parliamentary groups 1, 5 and 6.

 

3. The followers of Imam Khomeini and the leader Ayatollah Khamenei's line, which embraces a number of groups including The Association of Combatant Clergy, Islamic Coalition Party, the Islamic Association of Engineers and so forth, are situated in the first group whose members of course outnumber the other groups. Certainly, those Principalists who are veteran political activists believing in "attracting maximally" those with ideas somehow different from Principalists but not against the Islamic of the system. This group on the other hand avoid "repelling maximally". Messrs. Ali Larijani, the incumbent parliament speaker and former head of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC); Mohammad Hassan Abutorabi-Fard, the First Vice-Speaker of the Majlis; Mohammad-Reza Bahonar, the Second Vice-Speaker of the Majlis; Qolam Reza Mesbahi Moqaddam who heads a special Parliament committee tasked with considering the economic development; Ali Mottahari, a key member of the culture committee of Majlis are among the prominent members of this parliamentary group.

 

Conversely, the newcomer Principalists who cannot bear the conservative tradition and enjoy radical tendencies, or those who were not involved in permanent organizational activities can be absorbed by parliamentary groups 2, 3 and 4.

 

4. Isargaran (devotees of the Islamic Revolution and veterans of war) and Rahpouyan-e Enghelab-e Eslami (The Pathfinders of the Islamic Revolution) Society fall within the 4^th parliamentary group. Messrs. Haddad Adel (former Majlis Speaker), Ahmad Tavakoli and Elias Naderan are more closer to this group.

 

5. The Resistance Front of the Islamic Revolution parliamentary group belongs to the sacked members of the government or those who are against Mashaei.[iii] Obviously, when the head of administration needs them, they will form a coalition with the government parliamentary group to enhance the concept that they are the other side of Ahmadinejad’s coin. 

 

6. In contrast with the discipline dominated over the major European parliaments, membership in an Iranian parliamentary group does not imply total subordination to the group's ideas at an election. Casting votes in Iranian parliament, like some other countries is an independent act of fractional commitment and as well as political origin, it’s influenced by personal friendship, ethnic issues, trade approaches, lobbies and unfortunately a number of other tendencies. Therefore, even the most experienced analysts are not able to predict reactions precisely in the upcoming Majlis.

 

7. It would be better for the government to avoid establishing a parliamentary group formally. As due to his moves Ahmadinejad is currently under pressure, unlike the former times, any special support of him would be troublesome. [iv] In general, some analysts believe that this time Ahmadinejad would have a limited power in recruiting new allies.

 

8. The parliamentary history of the Islamic Republic of Iran reveals that up to this moment, the term "independents" have actually made no sense. Although after a round of Majlis election is held, the number of seats each group has won will be defined, the individual successful candidates will be generally titled as "independents" (which means ultra Principalist or ultra reformist) but all will finally join one of these parliamentary groups based on their beliefs or background, or out of expediency. However, this time "independents" seem to have a considerable parliamentary group (at least in the outset), the process of joining other parliamentary parties, forming coalitions, and even absorption or merging will take place step-by-step.