According to KhabarOnline, an Iranian News Agency, Since December 12, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has embarked on a five-day tour of the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, aiming to expand trade and energy cooperation while simultaneously strengthening Beijing’s political and diplomatic influence in the Middle East.
In an interview with KhabarOnline, Dr. Fardin Qoreishi—international relations expert and faculty member at the Faculty of Law and Political Science—emphasizes that China’s regional policy is driven less by political solidarity with Iran than by a logic of balance, pragmatism, and the maximization of economic interests. This approach, he argues, shows that Beijing is unwilling to jeopardize its extensive interests in Saudi Arabia and the UAE for Tehran, and that an exaggerated view of a “strategic partnership” with China could lead to self-deception in foreign policy.
Beijing Seeks to Be a Non-Interventionist Actor
How do you assess recent visits by Chinese officials to the Middle East—particularly to the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan?
These trips are, first and foremost, a targeted effort to deepen China’s strategic partnerships with Arab countries and to prepare political groundwork and public opinion for the second China–Arab Summit, scheduled to be held in Beijing next year. By focusing on energy, investment, advanced technologies, and a mediating role in issues such as Palestine and regional stability, Beijing is trying to position itself as a stable, low-cost, and non-interventionist actor compared to the United States.
Within this framework, the UAE and Saudi Arabia welcome China as a way to diversify their strategic partners and reduce exclusive dependence on Washington—while still relying on the U.S. security umbrella. Jordan, for its part, sees China as a complement to Western support and as a long-term investor in infrastructure and Belt and Road projects.
Riyadh’s Emphasis on the One-China Principle
What implications does Saudi Arabia’s renewed emphasis on accepting the One-China principle have?
Saudi Arabia’s renewed commitment to the “One-China” principle and its opposition to any form of separatism in Taiwan amount to a form of “political investment” in Beijing’s most sensitive security and identity red line. This stance has two main implications.
First, in return for this support, China is likely to show greater readiness to politically back Saudi priorities—such as Riyadh’s regional role, NEOM projects, and Saudi-led security initiatives—while pushing the relationship toward deeper cooperation in energy and technology. Second, this alignment reinforces cracks within the Western united front against China, demonstrating that even traditional U.S. allies in the Gulf are not neutral on Beijing’s sensitive identity issues and may actively support China’s positions.
That said, this should not be overstated. The fact that the United States has not reacted strongly to Saudi Arabia’s stance suggests the issue is not of exceptional importance to Washington.
China Has Not Backed UAE Sovereignty Over the Three Islands
How do you analyze China’s repeated references to supporting the UAE’s efforts to reach a peaceful solution regarding the three islands? To what extent does this affect Iran–China relations?
China has not supported UAE sovereignty over the islands. The joint China–UAE statement refers to backing the UAE’s efforts to reach a peaceful solution over Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa through dialogue and in accordance with the UN Charter. This wording primarily reflects diplomatic language emphasizing peaceful dispute resolution.
From Iran’s perspective, however, even using the term “dispute” and referring to negotiations implies recognition of a sovereignty contest—since Iran considers its sovereignty over the islands final and non-negotiable. China’s stance suggests a clear preference for accommodating a wealthy and high-capacity Arab partner (the UAE) over Iran’s sovereignty sensitivities, indicating that Beijing is willing to adopt language close to that of the Gulf Cooperation Council on an issue Iran views as vital.
The immediate consequence is suspicion and dissatisfaction in Iran. Some Iranian media have labeled this position a “double standard,” inconsistent with China’s claims regarding its own territorial integrity over Taiwan. This could reduce Tehran’s level of strategic trust in Beijing, even though China still sees value in maintaining economic and energy ties with Iran.
Overall, most countries engage in transactional diplomacy. China, too, is willing to offer such concessions in exchange for international support on its claim to Taiwan—especially since it knows Iran has limited room to mount a strong response against Beijing.
How Much Weight Does Iran Carry in China’s Middle East Policy?
In China’s Middle East strategy, how significant is Iran? Is Beijing willing to sacrifice its ties with Gulf states for Iran?
It appears that in China’s Middle East architecture, Iran is an important partner—but not the “central axis.” Rather, it is part of a multilateral balance. On one hand, Iran is a key energy supplier, an arms market, and a like-minded partner in opposing U.S. hegemony, as well as a participant in initiatives such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
On the other hand, the southern Gulf states—especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE—carry far greater weight in terms of investment volume, technological capacity, and financial stability. China is the largest trading partner of many of these countries, and the scale of mutual investment with them far exceeds that with Iran.
Accordingly, China is not willing to sacrifice its extensive interests in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other Gulf countries for Tehran. Beijing’s logic is to maximize relations with all sides and avoid choosing one over another. In real crises, China typically adopts a language of balance and pragmatic neutrality—supporting Iran only insofar as it does not impose significant costs on its broader relationships with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.
Iran’s Perception of China vs. Beijing’s Actual Behavior
Is there a degree of self-deception in Iran regarding its relationship with China, with China–Iran solidarity being exaggerated?
In Iran, China is sometimes portrayed not as a “realist great power,” but as a “partner of shared destiny” or a kind of political-civilizational anchor against the West. This image does not align with Beijing’s actual behavior—and such expectations are unrealistic.
Indicators such as China’s positions on the three islands, delays and limitations in fully implementing the 25-year cooperation agreement, and its prioritization of Arab Gulf partners all suggest that Beijing applies the same cost-benefit calculus and multilateral balancing toward Iran that it applies to other countries—not a logic of “ideological solidarity.”
From this perspective, it must be acknowledged that at critical moments, China prioritizes its broader economic and geopolitical interests over Iran’s sensitivities. A more realistic view is to see China not as a savior or a loyal ally, but as an opportunistic and calculating great power—one that can be cooperated with, but upon which national security policy cannot be built on the assumption of unconditional solidarity.
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