Zahra Khodayee
Syria Crisis is getting worse and worse. The government of Syria says it becomes the victim of a systematic destabilization plot led by some Arab countries and the West. On the other hand the rebellion or fighters against Assad’s regime claim that they are being slaughtered by Assad’s military machine for they had decided to change the way of they have been governed during the past 5 decades. Khabaronline has talked to Mehran Kamrava, Iranian scholar in George Town University in Qater about the very last situation of Syria and the arranges of the forces in the region.
Looking to the Syria crisis it looks like that there is a harsh conflict of interest between Iran block including, Iraq, Hezbollah and Syria and Saudi block including Qatar and Turkey. How much is the costs- benefits of each country in Syria?
How long can these blocks stand in their stances? I think the regional alignment (jebhebandi-e mantaghe) is in fact changing. But I am not sure it is the way you describe it. I think that positions are changing so rapidly that it is hard to tell that the different groups are. I think it is too early to put Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar in one camp and Iran, Iraq, and Syria in another. We need to take into account the position of outside players--like Russia, the United Nations, the EU, and the US--whose positions change and who have not adopted a clear stance one way or another. The bid player Egypt is also in turmoil and hasn't really adopted a position yet in the international arena. Also, it is very likely that Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar compete with each other over regional diplomatic and economic issues. So, I think right now we are looking at a regional alignment that is in a fluid state. It is in flux, and it is trying to form through alliances with itself and with other international actors. How long it will last, and what the costs and benefits are to each of the players, is too early to tell right now.
Where do the great powers stand in the Syria crisis?
The conservative sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf, especially Qatar and Saudi Arabia, have decided that Bashar Assad's regime must go. I think they reached this decision based on a series of calculations, the primary one being their hope to control the direction of change in the post-Assad era and, in the future, investment opportunities in Syria. These were the two main reasons why Qatar became involved in Libya. Now, in Syria, Saudi Arabia doesn't want to be left behind and is therefore becoming involved alongside Qatar. Both see involvement in Syria as an opportunity to assert diplomatic leadership in the Arab world, especially now that Iraq and Egypt are out of the equation because of their own domestic difficulties. The European Union and the United States are interested in the Syrian crisis because they worry that instability in Syria would jeopardize their own regional interests--namely the flow of oil and Israel. They prefer an outcome that would see the removal of Bashar Assad and the replacement of the Assad regime with a weak state that would not pose a threat to Israel. Syria, of course, has been an ally of Iran and Iran does not want to see the overthrow of the Assad regime. What we have therefore are different perspectives by important regional and extra-regional players
What will happen in Israel if Assad falls?
That depends to a large extent on how the collapse of the Assad regime comes about--if he is overthrown, that is--and on who replaces him. Right now the civil war in Syria is spiraling out of control and it is very hard to predict an outcome. The UN has blamed both sides, and it is hard to tell what will happen in the coming weeks and months. If Assad survives the crisis, the situation will not change a great deal, although he would have been weakened and is even less likely to have Syria's demand for a return of the Golan Heights listened to by Israel and the US. If he is overthrown and is eventually replaced by a government made-up of the Muslim Brotherhood, the new government is likely to be more hostile and assertive in relation to Israel, though still weak militarily to do anything about it. Nonetheless, it may be friendlier toward Hamas. In either case, as we are seeing with developments in Egypt, one of the biggest losers of the Arab Spring is Israel. So no matter what happens in Syria, Israel's position in the region is likely to change for the worse.
Don’t you think that the Rising of the Islamists in the region is a threat to Israel?
I think in some ways I gave the answer to this in the last question. In general, Islamists tend to have a harsher view toward Israel, and the fact that they will be coming to power does not bode well for Israel. So in one respect Israel is the big loser because of the recent uprisings across the Arab world. What consequences this will have inside Israel for Israeli politics, or for the way that Israel treats the Palestinians, is hard to tell right now.
If we accept the threat, then what is going to be the fate of Peace process in this time?
I think Israel's position in the peace process has more to do with domestic Israeli politics than with developments outside of its borders. Of course, events in places like Syria and Egypt are not inconsequential for Israeli politics and will have some bearing on how Israel behaves internationally and in relation to the Palestinians. But what is directly consequential for Israel's stance in relation to the peace process is domestic politics. Right now, the right-wing of the Likud is in power--under Netanyahu--and Netanyahu is doing everything he can to sabotage the peace process. Kadima has a new leader, Moshe Mofaz, who has said it is important to restart negotiations with the Palestinians and to become serious in the peace process. When it comes to the peace process, what is important is how Israel's domestic politics turns out rather than who comes to power outside of Israel
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