Reyhane Hejazi - At a time when the United States, after receiving Iran’s concrete proposals in Oman and Qatar, reverted to a path of threats—from the escalation of rhetoric by Donald Trump to the deployment of an aircraft carrier and additional fighter jets to the region—Geneva was more than just a venue for talks. It became the intersection of two distinct logics: the logic of “coercion through threat” versus the logic of “deterrence before negotiation.”
The U.S. Strategy: Pressure Outside, Concessions at the Table
Washington’s behavioral pattern is clear. First, a display of power in the field and in the media; then an attempt to translate that pressure into concessions at the negotiating table. This is the familiar model of “force-based diplomacy,” which assumes that the opposing side, when faced with military threats, will soften its positions. In this logic, an aircraft carrier is not primarily a weapon of war; it is a tool of negotiation.
But this model rests on a critical assumption: that the other side perceives the threat as credible and calculates the cost of resistance to be higher than the cost of concession.
Tehran’s Response: Changing the Assumption
It was precisely at this point that the stance of Seyed Ali Khamenei fundamentally altered the equation. His remarks—delivered exactly as the Geneva talks were underway—were not an emotional reaction to threats, but a carefully calibrated strategic message to Washington. When he stated:
“An aircraft carrier is indeed a dangerous instrument, but more dangerous than the carrier is the weapon that can send it to the bottom of the sea,”
two messages were conveyed simultaneously:
- The military threat is not regarded as credible.
- The cost of confrontation would be regional and uncontrollable.
Within this framework, the invocation of a “regional war” takes on its meaning. This was not a declaration of war, but a declaration of the impossibility of a limited war—precisely what U.S. strategy requires and yet seeks to avoid.
When the leader of a country neutralizes a threat, the psychological burden of pressure is lifted from the negotiating team. The sound of an aircraft carrier’s engines no longer automatically translates into concessions on the table. The other side is compelled to enter negotiations with real offers.
Iran’s Three Parallel Policies
Alongside this strategic message, Iran activated three parallel tracks:
In diplomacy: the preparation of a dual-track proposal with detailed substance and a serious presence at the Geneva negotiations—sending a clear signal that Tehran has not abandoned talks, but is not pursuing them from a position of weakness.
In the field: smart-control military drills in the Strait of Hormuz, coupled with explicit warnings demonstrating that deterrence is not merely rhetorical. The message was unambiguous: if military pressure is to be used as a negotiating tool, its costs will spiral beyond control.
In internal security and media: readiness to counter any attempt at domestic destabilization, given that experience has shown internal unrest to be a complement to external pressure.
This is the very synergy of field and diplomacy. Crucially, it does not mean closing the door to negotiations; rather, it means removing dialogue from a state of emergency and transforming it into a conscious choice.
In this context, the Supreme Leader’s emphasis that “if negotiations are to take place, predetermining their outcome in advance is a wrong and foolish approach” established a strategic principle: negotiation is a tool for problem-solving, not an instrument of surrender.
This statement directly targeted the core of the U.S. demand—namely, securing a predetermined outcome (the deprivation of Iran’s nuclear capabilities) before talks even begin.
A Shift in the Balance
It was under this balance that the second round of indirect talks in Geneva was held. The post-negotiation remarks by Seyed Abbas Araghchi—ranging from “very serious discussions” and “good progress” to an emphasis on the difficulties ahead—accurately reflected this atmosphere: neither naïve optimism nor deadlock.
Even the Omani foreign minister’s comments about “progress in defining common objectives” indicate that military pressure has failed to dominate the negotiating table unilaterally, though it has not yet bridged the underlying security gaps.
The most important achievement of this phase is neither an agreement nor even a draft text, but a shift in the other side’s mindset. When the United States realizes that military threats not only fail to yield concessions but actually raise the costs of negotiation, it will be forced to reconsider its strategy and adjust the rules of the game.
In this sense, Ayatollah Khamenei rewrote the negotiation equation:
Negotiation—yes.
Imposition—no.
Power before agreement,
and diplomacy carried on the shoulders of the field.
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