According to KhabarOnline, Rafael Grossi, Director General of the IAEA, has stated that for a deal to be finalized between Iran and the United States, agency inspectors must be granted access to Iranian nuclear facilities damaged in recent strikes. According to Grossi, inspectors have not been able to visit the Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan sites since U.S. attacks in June.
On June 22, the United States launched an operation dubbed “Operation Midnight Hammer,” targeting three major Iranian nuclear complexes, including the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, the Natanz facility, and the Isfahan nuclear site. Tehran says the strikes caused significant damage.
Referring to what he described as “very sensitive materials close to weapons-grade,” Grossi emphasized: “It is obvious that for there to be an agreement, we need to check what is there and in what condition, to ensure that no diversion has taken place.” He called for these inspections to be incorporated into what he described as a “comprehensive” agreement, adding that either a deal covering all outstanding issues would be reached — or there would be no deal at all.
For some observers, the statement signals the agency’s attempt not merely to act as a technical verifier, but to secure a defined place within the political architecture of any future accord.
Iran Suspends Cooperation, Seeks New Framework
Following the June 2025 strikes, Iran suspended its cooperation with the IAEA, announcing that inspectors would only be granted access with the authorization of its Supreme National Security Council. Tehran has also cited environmental and safety risks stemming from what it calls “illegal attacks” by the United States and Israel, arguing that a new inspection mechanism must first be established for damaged facilities.
Iranian officials maintain that until such a framework is defined, access to the targeted sites will not be possible. Some authorities in Tehran have also suggested that information previously shared with the agency may have contributed to targeted attacks on its nuclear infrastructure — a claim that heightens sensitivities around the role of international oversight bodies in a volatile security environment.
Historical Shadows and Structural Questions
The use of UN-derived inspection data in military operations has historical precedent. Declassified documents in past years indicated that intelligence obtained through United Nations inspections under the UNSCOM program was used in U.S. and British strikes against Iraq in 1998.
Such precedents feed skepticism among some analysts about the structural independence of the IAEA. The concept of the agency was first proposed in 1953 by U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower under the “Atoms for Peace” initiative. Critics also point to the composition of the IAEA Board of Governors — where advanced nuclear technology states and European countries hold a significant share of seats — as well as the substantial U.S. contribution to the agency’s budget, as factors that may enhance Western influence over its policy direction.
In this context, Grossi’s insistence on renewed inspections is seen as more than a purely technical matter. It could become one of the central sticking points in the negotiations, where Iran’s security concerns, the agency’s verification mandate, and Washington’s political objectives intersect.
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