According to Khabaronline, However, in the author’s view, this interpretation does not accurately reflect the current situation. Numerous signs and indicators in the region and inside Israel suggest that what is unfolding now more closely resembles the final stages preceding the outbreak of a war.
One could even argue that the signs pointing toward war are more pronounced and serious than those seen prior to the so-called 12-day war.
At that time, aside from the final two or three days before hostilities began, there was little concrete evidence indicating an imminent conflict, and the available clues pointed only to a limited war. By contrast, a set of tangible and substantive indicators now suggests that the region is likely on the brink of a broader war than before, with different objectives.
The scale and sophistication of the U.S. military assets being deployed make it difficult to interpret their ultimate purpose as merely pressuring Tehran into an agreement—especially since the United States itself views the chances of achieving such a one-sided deal as nearly impossible.
Had Washington even harbored some hope of reaching such an agreement, it is unlikely it would have borne the enormous cost of deploying roughly two-thirds of its aircraft carriers along with this vast array of military equipment solely for leverage. A far lower level of force would have sufficed.
Accordingly, the deployment of this volume of warships and weaponry appears not to be a show of force, psychological warfare, or negotiating pressure, but rather the result of a prior decision in favor of war.
To be sure, a form of psychological and perceptual warfare is underway—but not as the primary purpose of these deployments. Instead, it functions as part of a complex media and messaging component of the U.S. government’s path toward war.
This psychological operation is evident in Washington’s continuous, indirect injection of security-related news mixed with disparate, selective data and at times deliberately ambiguous statements, all serving multiple objectives.
One such objective is evident in the contradictory narrative whereby, despite the unprecedented deployment of military equipment to the region—unmatched in at least the past two decades—U.S. media messaging continues to claim that President Trump has not yet made a final decision and is still weighing options.
It seems implausible and unreasonable that the United States would first deploy two-thirds of its aircraft carriers and such an immense volume of weaponry, only then to begin deliberating and deciding.
Logic dictates that assessment and decision-making should precede deployment. Even if the sole aim were to apply negotiating pressure while still harboring some hope that Tehran might accept maximal demands, there would still be no need for such a massive military buildup—particularly of assets intended exclusively for operational use.
On this basis, the U.S. government’s media narrative over the past two to three weeks—especially the emphasis on Trump not having made a final decision—likely pursues three goals:
First, managing the domestic political environment by projecting a preference for diplomacy, particularly toward anti-war constituencies in the United States, while simultaneously preparing American and global public opinion for war.
Second, laying the groundwork for war at logistical, security, intelligence, and operational levels.
Third, influencing Iranian calculations by creating confusion in decision-making while preserving the element of surprise—not regarding the occurrence of war itself, but in its tactics and methods.
The negotiations can also be understood within this framework. Agreeing to talks limited to the nuclear file and initially avoiding the presentation of unacceptable conditions is less a sign of genuine U.S. willingness to reach a deal than a calculated move within this broader puzzle.
If the United States were truly inclined to an agreement to the extent of setting aside missile and regional issues and focusing solely on the nuclear dossier, such a massive military mobilization would be unjustifiable—even if the intention were to extract concessions incrementally.
Of course, the existence of a prior decision for war does not necessarily mean that it is irreversible. Yet reversing course under these circumstances would entail a very heavy cost, one that Tehran is unlikely to accept.
The initiation of a potential war is typically based on an assessment that Iran’s response can be anticipated and controlled. But if the initial, very heavy strikes fail to contain Iran’s reaction, the duration of the war—as well as its scope and consequences—will be determined by the level and breadth of that response.
It remains to be seen whether the United States initiates such a war first, or Israel, or both together.
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